We provide several types of central banker's preferences according to their monetary policy choices. Although not exhaustive, our list covers from extreme (conservative and populist) to moderate behaviors, such that it is flexible in relation to the degree of conservativeness, as well as in relation to monetary regimes. We also use the traditional axiomatic approach for utility representation in order to investigate which of those preferences admit numerical representation. Our main finding states that so called stabilizer central bank is the only that admits representation through utility. Nevertheless, we show that even preferences without utility representation may be useful as alternatives for studies which propose different types of central bank.
It is possible to observe different types of central bankers' preferences through the behavior of their monetary policies. For instance, a central banker may be more conservative by focusing his policy on fighting inflation, or more populist by trying to increase output over price stability. Yet the most usual behavior found both in practice and literature is one which concerning about those two key variables. Formally, such preferences usually are represented by a loss function like
where π, π * , y, y * and λ are inflation, its target (which may be implicit), output, its target (potential output) and the relative weight given to output control, respectively.
In this formulation, a higher (lower) λ indicates a more populist (conservative) central banker 2 .
In fact, almost all models about central bank's decision assume preferences like those expressed by (1). The vast literature related to asymmetric information problem in monetary policy is a good example of the theoretical limitation in choosing monetary authority's types (e. g. Barro, 1986; Canzoneri, 1985; Cukierman and Liviatan, 1991; Nolan and Schaling, 1996; Walsh, 2000) . In general, these papers assume that the central bank may be either extremely conservative or an optimizer who always act to maximize its expected loss function. This is exactly the case presented by Backus and Driffill (1985) , in on of the earliest reputational models of monetary policy. The first type is a single-minded inflation fighter while the second one wants minimize a function of type
(1). The same may be found when we analyse studies which deals with the optimal degree of conservativeness of the central bank, like the seminal paper of Rogoff (1985) . Even recent new keynesian DSGE models adopt loss functions like (1) (e. g. Clarida et al., 1999 2 A typology of central bankers
Preliminaries
We assume that central bankers has preferences over only two variables, namely inflation, π, and output, y. Let Π and Y be the subsets of R, then (π, y) ∈ Π × Y ⊆ R × R. Despite of being the most usual case found in literature, the study of two dimension problem has the advantage of allowing analogies to the standard two goods consumer problem.
Nevertheless, our results may be easily generalized to choice sets of any finite dimension.
For example, they may apply to a central banker with preferences over inflation, output and exchange rate.
Definitions below are necessary in remaining of the text. In the following we closely follow notation adopted by Debreu (1954) and Ok (2010) .
Definition 2.1 A binary relation on Π × Y is said to be:
words, is a binary relation that is transitive and reflexive.
As usual, definition 2.2 accounts to all the information that corcerns how a central banker compares any two alternatives according to his "tastes". We have choosen define preferences as preorder rather than partial order because we wish let choices free to be incomplete. Our aim is to allow behavior like the following. Consider two different scenarios: the first one presents high inflation and high output, while in the second there is low inflation and low output. Some type of central banker may find hard to decide which situation is better.
Another important definition is that of utility representation.
Definition 2.3 Let be a preference relation on Π × Y . We say that a function u :
If such a function exists, we say that admits a utility representation, and refer to u as a utility function for .
As we have mentioned above, we consider the central bank's loss function and the central banker's utility as synonymous, such that function u in definition 2.3 is actually a disutility. Yet such fact does not change our analysis because a disutility function is just a negative of utility one, such that for the agent to maximize an utility function is equivalent to minimize a disutility one.
Finally, definitions of continuity and convexity will have a major role in our existence theorems.
be the upper contour set and the lower contour set of central banker, respectively. A binary relation on Π × Y is said to be continuous on Π × Y if for all (π, y) ∈ Π × Y , the upper contour set and lower contour set of (π, y) are closed.
Definition 2.5 A binary relation on Π×Y is said to be convex if for any (π 1 , y 1 ), (π 2 , y 2 ), (π 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Π × Y , where (π 1 , y 1 ) (π 3 , y 3 ) and (π 2 , y 2 ) (π 3 , y 3 ) is the case of
Central bankers' types
We list several types of central bankers below.
1. Conservative: this central banker only aims to minimize inflation, such that output is considered in his choice between two alternative scenarios only when inflation is the same in both cases. Formally, (π 1 , y 1 ) CON (π 2 , y 2 ) if and only if π 1 < π 2 or π 1 = π 2 and y 1 > y 2 . Thus, this central banker has lexicographic preferences.
2. Populist: this central banker is the extreme opposite of conservative one. Now the only goal is to increase output and inflation is only considered in situations with two equal outputs. Again, preferences are lexicographic: (π 1 , y 1 ) P OP (π 2 , y 2 ) if and only if y 1 > y 2 or y 1 = y 2 and π 1 < π 2 .
3. Conservative with inflation target: this central banker seeks to minimize the distance between observed inflation and its target level, π * , and only consider output when this distance is the same in two alternative scenarios. Given a target level fixed, preferences are formally expressed by (π 1 , y 1 ) CON * (π 2 , y 2 ) if and only if
4. Stabilizer: when there are targets of inflation and output 3 , the stabilizer central banker wants to approximate observed inflation and product to their targets. However the weight given to inflation stabilization may not be the same that given to output. Let λ be a parameter that measures the relative weight given to output and y * be the output target, we define preferences of a stabilizer central banker as and (π 1 , y 1 ) ASY (π 2 , y 2 ) if and only if π 1 < π 2 or π 1 = π 2 and y 1 > y 2 , if
List Regarding the nomenclature adopted, we closely follow the large literature of optimal monetary policy. For instance, the central banker which gives much more weight to inflation fight relative to output stabilization is called conservative by Rogoff (1985) and Barro (1986) among others. The name "populist" for the central banker mainly concerned with output growth, in its turn, is adopted by Guzzo and Velasco (1999) (see also Berger et al., 2001; Jerger, 2002; Lippi, 2002) . Despite of dealing with another type of asymmetry, the names of our asymmetric central bankers are based on Nobay and Peel (2003) and Ruge-Murcia (2003) . Further, we choose call "optimistic" the central banker who always wants more output and less inflation because of the great difficult of achieving such goal.
To best of our knowledge, term "optimist" has never used in literature.
Example below illustrates differences between central banker's types and easily enable us to check some of above axioms.
Example 2.6 Lets consider the following "bundles" of inflation and output: (1, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 1), (2, 2) ∈ Π × Y . Further, suppose that π * = 1 and y * = 1. Then we have:
2. (2, 2) P OP (0, 1) P OP (1, 1) P OP (1, 0); an optimistic type would choose neither of them because the first one has lower inflation while the second has greater output. As we have defined ST A , it is also incomplete. The reason is that "bundles" above and below inflation target are not comparable. Yet we may change its definition by adding a criterium of decision for these situations -inflation below inflation target is preferred, for instance. Such change does not modify our result, such that we follow the original definition.
Our first task is to answer whether all central banker's types listed above satisfy conditions of definition 2.2, that is, whether they all are preorders on Π × Y . Proposition 2.7 answers that question.
Proposition 2.7 i is a preference on Π×Y for i = {CON, P OP, CON * , ST A, OP T, ASY }.
One interesting fact is that all preferences defined above have the desirable property of convexity. It turns out all central bankers analised consider "averages better than the extremes". As it is well known, this roughly corresponds to the concept of diminishing marginal utility (without requiring utility functions). Theorem 2.8 below states it formally.
Theorem 2.8 i is convex on Π × Y for i = {CON, P OP, CON * , ST A, OP T, ASY }.
Existence of loss function
Which of central banker's preferences defined in the section 2.2 admits an utility representation? There are several theorems on utility representation in literature (e.g. Eilenberg, 1941; Rader, 1963) . Because the central banker's choice set is Π × Y ⊆ R × R, it suffices to consider those results which deal with separable metric spaces. Within such context, we based our analysis on the well known result due to Debreu (1954) : Debreu, 1954 ) Let X be a topological space with a countable basis, and a complete preference relation on X. If is continuous, then it can be represented by a continuous utility function.
As we have mentioned above, the central banker's set of alternatives X = Π × Y is separable, which implies it has a countable basis. Therefore, it satisfies one of the requirements of theorem 3.1. We must then verify which type of central banker has complete and continuous preferences in order to decide the applicability of Debreu's result.
In fact, our main contribution in this section is a stronger result, given by theorem 3.2 below.
Theorem 3.2 The only central banker's type whose preference admits utility representation is the stabilizer ( ST A ).
Some comments are necessary about theorem 3.2. First, note that it implicitly makes two claims: stabilizer central banker does admit utility representation but all the remaining types do not. It implies we must divide strategy of proof in two parts. Concerning the existence part (stabilizer), it suffices to use theorem 3.1. However, Debreu's result enumerates only necessary conditions for utility existence. In fact, it does not exclude the possibility of discontinuous or incomplete preferences admit utility representation. Thus we must show non-existence part (other types) through other procedure.
Second comment is related to first one. Since all central banker's type except stabilizer admit utility representation, and considering necessary conditions given by theorem 3.1, we may ask which of such requirements are not satisfied by those preferences. First, observe that the optimist central banker has incomplete preferences 5 . In order to see that, consider π 1 < π 2 , y 1 < y 2 and note he is not able to choose between (π 1 , y 1 ) and (π 2 , y 2 ). In addition, it is well know that lexicographic preferences are not continuous, such that conservative and populist types clearly do not satisfy those conditions. Asymmetric preference does not satisfy them as well, because it is formed by two lexicographic segments (below and above π * ). Proposition below summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 3.3 i is not continuous on Π×Y for i = {CON, P OP, CON * , OP T, ASY }.
Concluding Remarks
Although the only preference that admits utility representation be the stabilizer, it does not mean that the other types of central banker are not able to make a decision. In order to see that, consider one of those preferences of lexicographic type, say populist. Now In this sense, v(·) serves as an adequate behavior rule for preferences like populist one.
A more general result is provided by literature of representation of incomplete preferences (e. g. Evren and Ok, 2011) .
Definition 4.1 Let be a preference relation on Π × Y . We say that a nonempty set U of real functions on Π × Y represents provided that (π 1 , y 1 ) (π 2 , y 2 ) if and only if u(π 1 , y 1 ) ≥ u(π 2 , y 2 ) for each u ∈ U for every (π 1 , y 1 ), (π 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Π × Y . If such a set U exists, we say that admits a multiutility representation.
Proposition 4.2 There exists a multi-utility representation for every preference relation.
As a example of mult-utility representation, consider the optimistic central banker.
Define u 1 : Π × Y → R by u 1 (π, y) := −π and u 2 : Π × Y → R by u 2 (π, y) := y.
Then note that {u 1 , u 2 } represents OP T . In fact, as proposition 4.2 makes clear, there are multi-utility representations for all preferences, such that it suffices to find which U satisfies definition 4.1 in each case.
We conclude by recalling that always there is a loss by dealing with preferences without utility representation. The main reason is the impossibility of using standard optimization techniques. In this context, for models of central bank decision that follow traditional approach initiated in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) , our central result is a bad news.
Those studies actually are restricted to assume stabilizer behavior for central banker and consequently adopt utility function like (1). However, we have shown that there is some flexibility if we are able to give up of differential calculus tools. Furthermore, all our analysis makes sense if preferences of the central banker are not necessarily the same of the representative household, because the case in that these preferences are equal has been adressed by Woodford (2002) .
for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, two cases are possible. The first one is max {π 1 , π 2 } < π 3 , such that t(π 1 , y 1 ) + (1 − t)(π 2 , y 2 ) (π 3 , y 3 ). The second is max {π 1 , π 2 } = π 3 , which implies π 1 = π 2 . But since ty 1 + (1 − t)y 2 ≥ min {y 1 , y 2 } ≥ y 3 , we also have t(π 1 , y 1 ) + (1 − t)(π 2 , y 2 ) CON (π 3 , y 3 ).
For OP T , assume again that (π 1 , y 1 ) OP T (π 3 , y 3 ) and (π 2 , y 2 ) OP T (π 3 , y 3 ). Then
we have π 1 ≤ π 3 and y 1 ≥ y 3 , and π 2 ≤ π 3 and y 2 ≥ y 3 . It follows that tπ 1 + (1 − t)π 2 ≤ max {π 1 , π 2 } ≤ π 3 and ty 1 + (1 − t)y 2 ≥ min {y 1 , y 2 } ≥ y 3 for any t ∈ [0, 1]. We conclude therefore that t(π 1 , y 1 ) + (1 − t)(π 2 , y 2 ) OP T (π 3 , y 3 ).
Finally, suppose (π 1 , y 1 ) ST A (π 3 , y 3 ) and (π 2 , y 2 ) ST A (π 3 , y 3 ). By definition of stabilizer central banker,
and
Now note that
where we use expressions (2), (3) and the triangle inequality. Thus, by (4) we have t(π 1 , y 1 ) + (1 − t)(π 2 , y 2 ) ST A (π 3 , y 3 ). Next, take π 2 such that π 2 < π 1 . Again, we have u(π 2 , 1) > u(π 2 , 0) and R(π 2 ) = [u(π 2 , 0), u(π 2 , 1)] is nondegenerate. Further, R(π 1 ) ∩ R(π 2 ) = ∅ because π 2 < π 1 implies u(π 2 , 0) > u(π 1 , 1). Observe that we can define R(π j ) for any π j ∈ Π ⊆ R, and such that all sets are disjoint from each other. Moreover, there are as many R(π j ) as the number of real numbers. Let Φ(y) = {R(π j )|(π j , y) ∈ Π × Y } the set of all those intervals. Thus, cardinality of Φ(y) is 2 ℵ 0 . Now, let Q(π j ) = {q|q ∈ Q ∩ R(π j )} be the set of all rational numbers contained in R(π j ) for π j ∈ Π ⊆ R. Clearly, Q(π 1 ) ∩ Q(π 2 ) = ∅ for any π 1 , π 2 ∈ Π with π 1 = π 2 .
Finally, if we define Θ(y) = {Q(π j )|(π j , y) ∈ Π × Y } as the set of all Q(π j ), it is possible to note that there is a injective map from Φ(y) into Θ(y) because each R(π j ) contains Q(π j ). Therefore, we conclude that cardinality of Θ(y) is 2 ℵ 0 . But it is impossible given that Θ(y) ⊆ Q.
Proof. Proposition 3.3. It suffices to prove the result for one of the types, because the procedure is similar for i = CON, P OP, CON * , OP T, ASY . Lets show that conservative with inflation target preference is not continuous. In fact, as proof of proposition 2.7 makes clear, CON * is a kind of lexicographic order too. For, consider its upper contour set Γ + ( π, y) = {(π, y)|(π, y) CON * ( π, y)} and define a sequence (π n , y n ) = ( π − For the sake of simplicity, let Π × Y ⊆ R 2 + . Given |π n − π
we have (π n , y n ) ⊆ Γ + ( π, y). However, observe that (π n , y n ) → ( π, − y * . Thus, Γ + ( π, y) is not closed and then CON * is not continuous.
